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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS,
STATE OF UTAH
BANK ONE, UTAH, N.A.
Plaintiff and Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
CaseNo.20000785-CA

THE CITY OF
WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant and Appellee,

To the Honorable Court of 4ppeals:
The City of West Jordan, the Defendant in Cause No.990909640, in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod,
Judge presiding, and Appellee before the Utah Court of Appeals, respectfully submits this
brief in reply to the brief filed by Appellant appealing the Summary Judgement granted in
the favor of Appellee. Pursuant to Rule 24(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
parties will be referred to as "Appellant" and the "Appellee."

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

9

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

10

I.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE
OF CLAIM FILED MARCH 22, 2000 WAS UNTIMELY

10

THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE ESTOPPED
FROM RAISING A FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM
ARGUMENT UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT

15

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

23

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAW

PAGE

Anske v. Palisades Park. 139 N.J. Super. 342, (App. Div. 1976)

21

Cappadona v. Eckelmann. 388 A.2d 239, (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)

13

Cornwall v. Larsen. et al. 571 P.2d 925, (Utah 1977)

18, 19

Dav v. State bv and Through LTtah Dept. of Public Safety.
882 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Utah 1994)

10

Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission. 945 P.2d 125 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997)

20

Hill v. Middletown Bid of Ed.. 443 A.2d 225 (NJ. Super. A.D. 1982)

21

Johnson v. Citv of Bountiful. 996 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998)
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office. 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980)

16, 17
14

Jepson v. State. 846 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1993)

12, 13

Litster v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933, (Utah App. 1992)
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. Of State Lands.

21,22

802 P. 2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990)

20, 21

Rice v. Granite School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969)

16, 17

Sawyers v. Sawyers. 558 P.2d 607, 608-609 (Utah 1976)

20

Seale v. Gowans. 923 P. 2d 1361, (Utah 1996)

10

Shunk v. State. 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996)

15, 16

3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
PAGE
UTAH STATE CODE
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq

7, 14, 15, 16

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13

8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20,21

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309

12, 13

Utah Code Ann § 54-8a-5

13

Utah Code Ann § 54-8a-7

13

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(d)

1

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about September 22, 1999, Appellant commenced an action against Upper
Valley Utilities (hereinafter "UVU") and Appellee before the Third District Court, Salt Lake
Department, Judge Stephen L. Henroid, presiding ("District Court"). (R.l-10). Pursuant to
its Complaint, Appellant sought recovery from these entities for sums which had been
expended by Appellant to repair a sewer line which was had been damaged by drilling
activities of UVU. (R. 1-10). The Complaint stated causes of action for negligence, breach
of statutory duty and unjust enrichment. (R. 1-12).
On April 20, 2000, Defendant UVU filed for Summary Judgment. (R. 246). The
basis of UVU's Motion for Summary Judgment was that prior to commencing their drilling
activities they had contacted Blue Stakes and requested the marking of all underground
utilities. (R. 247). UVU further contended that the sewer line which had been damaged by
their drilling activities was not properly marked. (R. 248). By Minute Entry dated May 23,
2000, (R. 336) the District Court concluded that UVU had complied with the legal
requirements for requesting the marking of underground utilities prior to commencing their
drilling activities. This Order has not been appealed by any party.
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 24, 2000. (R. 72). The
Motion for Summary Judgment of Appellee was predicated upon Appellant's failure to serve
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Appellee a Notice of Claim within one year of the accrual of Appellant's cause of action.
(R. 75-115). This Motion was granted by the District Court by Minute entry dated May 23,
2000 (R. 337), which Minute Entry was subsequently reduced to an Order on June 28,2000.
(R. 383-384). The District Court ruled that Appellant's Notice of Claim filed March 22,
2000 was untimely as Appellant's claim accrued on the date Appellant was injured, March
15, 1999. (Id.) Because Appellant filed its notice of claim more than one year after the
claim accrued, the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Appellant's
Complaint. (Id.)
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court on July 7,2000
(R. 401). The Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal and brief. (R. 405).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On February 25, 1999, UVU prepared for drilling activities by notifying "Blue
Stakes" of its intent to excavate in the vicinity of 9000 South to 9700 South Redwood Road.
(R. 231-232). Drilling commenced sometime after this date and before March 15, 1999,
when Appellant first learned of an obstruction in its sewer line. (R. 1-10). As a result of the
drilling performed by UVU, Appellant suffered damage to the sewer line servicing the
Appellant's property. (R. 120,146-7). As noted, Appellant was made aware of this problem
by the subsequent difficulty that occurred with the operation of the pluming on his property
6

on March 15, 1999. (R. 1-10). Appellant notified Appellee of the sewer line problem on
March 15, 1999, and the line was then inspected by Appellee. (R. 120, 170). At a March
22, 1999 meeting between Appellant, Appellee, and UVU, a dispute arose reg rding who
was liable to pay for the sewer line to be repaired. (R. 121, 147, 170). On April 1, 1999,
Appellant hired a private contractor to repair the sewer line. (R. 122).
Appellant commenced action against Appellee by filing a Complaint on Sep ember
27, 1999. (R. 1-10).

Appellant's Complaint alleged that the cause of action arose on or

about March 15, 1999. (R. 1-10). On or about Mid October of 1999, legal counsel for
Appellant contacted a West Jordan City Attorney and asked the counsel for Appellee how
to properly serve process on Appellee. (R. 190-191). Appellant's counsel failed to identi V
himself as counsel for the Appellant or clarify why he was asking Appellee to provide such
information. (Id.). Appellee nonetheless informed the caller to whom such service was to
be made. (Id.) The parties discuss nothing beyond how to serve process upon Appellee.
(Id.). Appellee accepted service of Appellant's Complaint on October 26,1999 and filed an
Answer on November 12, 1999. (R. 41, 47). Appellant's complaint did not allege that
Appellant had complied with the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, nor did Appellant's Complaint acknowledge the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act in any other manner. (R. 1-10). Appellee's Answer included the affirmative
defense that one or more of Appellant's claims may be barred by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.. (R. 53).
After Appellant's counsel granted one extension of time in which to return
7

Appellant's Interr* gatories, Appellee filed a Certificate of Service of Answers to
Appellant's Inter ogatories before the District Court on or about March 24, 2000 with a
Mailing Certific te dated March 20,2000. (R. 72,158,192,193). After reading Appellee's
Answers to Pk .ntiff s First Set of Interrogatories, Appellant realized, for the first time, that
Utah Code A m. § 63-30-13 required Appellant to serve Appellee with a Notice of Claim
within one /ear after a claim arises, and that Appellant had not filed a Notice of Claim
before cor lmencing this action. (R. 158).
C l March 22, 2000, Appellant served Appellee with a notice of claim. (AB 8).
Appell: nt's Notice of Claim departs from the factual allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint in
that t\e Notice of Claim alleges the underlying cause of action did not arise as until a
mee ing occurred on March 22, 1999, between Appellant and Appellee's Public Works
De jartment employees, when the damage to the sewer line was discussed. (R. 78,123). On
K arch 24, 1999, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Appellant's
failure to comply with the statutory requirements outlined in the Governmental Immunity
Act. (R.72, 158).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Appellant served Appellee with a Notice of Claim on March 22,2000, requesting that
Appellee be reimbursed the costs of a repair performed on April 1, 1999, for a specific
injury to a sewer line that occurred on March 15, 1999. Appellant argues that they did not
fail to met the statutorily defined requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
specifically their duty to file a Notice of Claim within one year of the date on which the
cause of action accrued. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Appellant challenges the District
Court's ruling that as a mater of law, Appellant's Notice of Claim filed on March 22, 2000
was untimely. Appellee believes the District Court was correct in their finding that the cause
of action arose on March 15,1999, and as a result the subsequent filing of a Notice of Claim
on March 22, 2000 was untimely.
Alternatively, Appellant argues that even if Appellant's damages occurred on March
15, 1999, and as a result the March 22, 2000 filing did not met the statutorily defined
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Appellee should be estopped from
relying on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to bar Appellant's claims. The Appellant
presents allegations of having been induced and mislead into failing to file a timely Notice
of Claim. The District Court correctly found that the Appellee did not induce or mislead
Appellant, and as a result, the District Court was correct in their finding that the Appellee
was not estopped from raising Appellant's failure to file a Notice of Claim as an affirmative
defense.

9

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM
FILED MARCH 22, 2000 WAS UNTIMELY.

This Court should uphold the District Court's ruling that Appellant's Notice of Claim,
filed after a year had lapsed from the date Appellant's claim accrued. Appellee agrees with
Appellant's statement of the law governing when a limitation period begins to run, which
is, "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Dav
v. State bv and Through Utah Dept. of Public Safety. 882 P.2d 1150.1153 (Utah 1994). In
applying this rule of law to Appellant's case, the District Court ruled that damage to
Appellant's property was the last event necessary to trigger Appellant's cause of action, and
the damage to Plaintiffs property occurred on March 15, 1999. (R. 381). Appellant cites
this ruling as error. Appellant argues that the District Court should have ruled that
Appellant's claims were not perfected until the sum total of Appellant's damages accrued,
regardless of whether the actual injury occurred on March 15,1999. In an attempt to bolster
his argument, Appellant relies on Seale v. Gowans, which stands for the proposition that a
cause of action may not be brought for an "inchoate wrong." Seale v. Gowans, 923 P. 2d
1361, 1364 (Utah 1996). Appellee submits that the injury which occurred on March 15,
1999, the date upon which UVU injured the property by severing a sewer line, could not
possibly be characterized as an "inchoate wrong."
10

UVU inflicted a tangible, measurable injury to Appellant's property on March 15,
1999, which in itself gave rise to a claim for injury. Appellee asserts that Appellant's
monetary expense to repair the March 15,1999 damage merely evinces the degree of injury.
However, Appellant's payment to repair the damaged sewer lateral line cannot be
misconstrued to mean Appellant was not injured until it paid to repair the same. As noted
in Allegation No. 11 of Appellant's own Complaint, "rupture and damage [to the sewer
lateral line] caused loss of sewer service to [Appellee]." (R. 3). Accordingly, Appellant
was injured at the moment it lost sewer service, which occurred when UVU ruptured the
sewer lateral line on or about March 15, 1999. Appellant's loss of sewer service was a
tangible injury, cited by Appellant, which triggered commencement of Appellant's time to
file a Notice of Claim of Injury.
Appellant also asks this Court to assume arguendo that Appellant repaired a sewer
line belonging to Appellee. (AB. 12). In doing so, Appellee has raised an allegation for the
first time on appeal which was never raised before the District Court. (AB. 12). Appellee
disputes that it owns the damaged sewer, which is a lateral line servicing Appellant's
property. However, since Appellant never alleged this before the District Court, this Court
should not rely upon Appellant's allegation in calculating Appellant's time for filing a
Notice of Claim. This Court should instead rely upon General Allegation No. 11., which
was used as Appellant's basis for negligence in Allegation No. 29. (R. 3, 5).
Appellee further believes that if it had elected to pay to repair the sewer line,
Appellant would not have been prevented from bringing a subsequent cause of action
11

against Appellee for any remaining consequential damages associated with the disruption
of Appellant's sewer service. As a result of making such an argument, Appellant would
have to rely upon the March 15, 1999 injury to the sewer line as the last event necessary to
complete its cause of action. This fact highlights the inconsistency in Appellant's position
when reading its Notice of Claim together with its Complaint.
Appellee urges this Court to agree with the District Court's conclusion that, as a
matter of law, Appellant's notice of claim filed on March 22, 2000 was untimely under the
statutory guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Appellee submits that Jepson
v. State, 846 P.2d 485 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) provides the only basis for characterizing the
relationship between injury, damages, and commencement of a limitations period. In
Jepson. the plaintiff was injured by an automobile, driven by an employee for the Utah
Department of Corrections. Id. at 486. Similar to the Appellant in this case, the defendant
in Jepson filed a Notice of Claim after the time to do so had lapsed under the statutory
guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Id. Once the plaintiff commenced an
action for injuries sustained in the accident, the defendant filed a summary judgment motion,
based upon plaintiffs failure to timely file a Notice of Claim. Id. In his reply, the plaintiff
claimed that his injuries didn't meet the minimum statutory requisite showing of $3,000.00
in damages until over a year after the date of the accident. Id. Under Utah Code Ann. §
31A-22-309, the plaintiff was precluded from commencing an action until plaintiffs
damages equaled $3,000.00. In affirming the District Court's entry of summary judgment
for the defendant, the Utah Court of Appeals held that full knowledge of a claimant's
12

damages need not be established until the time of trial, and therefore do not toll the
limitation period for filing a Notice of Claim, or a Complaint:
Complaints are frequently filed before the full facts regarding injury and
liability are known
[Ajlthough uncertain that the threshold requirements
will be met, a claimant may nonetheless file a compliant in tort realizing,
however, that the claim may prove not to be not actionable in the event the
cost of treatment fails to equal the threshold amount, at least by time of trial.
Id. at 487.
Quoting Cappadona v. Eckelmann, 388 A.2d 239, 242 (1978). Appellee submits that
Appellant is in the same position as the plaintiff in Jepson. Looking forward from the date
of Appellant's injury, or March 15,1999, at which time Appellant was aware of such injury,
all of the elements necessary to bring a cause of action were known to Appellant. The only
remaining issue is the extent to which Plaintiff could seek damages for Appellant's injury.
Appellant's damages could have been resolved at any time up to the date of trial.
In light of Jepson, Appellant believes that Utah Code Ann § 54-8a-7 is analogous
to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309, in that § 54-8a-7 does not by itself govern when a claim
arises. Jepson, at 487. Appellee's duty to repair the sewer, if any, arises after there are
sufficient facts for Appellant to perfect its cause of action. Therefore, Appellee interprets
§ 54-8a-7 to describe the Appellee's requirement to mitigate damage to Appellee's own
sewer line after the Appellee has breached a statutory duty imposed by Utah Code Ann. §
54-8a-5. The facts of this case clearly show that any breach of statutory duty under § 54-8a5 would have occurred from the time Appellee received notice to mark its sewers, until the
injury occurred on March 15, 1999.
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Appellant's original Complaint asserts that the cause of action arose on March 15,
1999. (R. 2). Appellant now urges this court to consider facts alleged outside Appellant's
Complaint, in a Notice of Claim, that was filed on March 22, 2000. In Appellant's Brief,
Appellant implies that this Court can include facts mentioned in its Notice of Claim form,
because, "If the Notice is delivered after the filing of the Complaint a Plaintiff may amend
the Complaint to include allegations of compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act
and proceed after the 90 day waiting period

" (AB. 11, footnote / ) . While this general

rule is correct under Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980),
Appellant has misdirected its application to this case. Appellant never sought leave of the
District Court to amend its Complaint to conform with the facts of its Notice of Claim.
Because Appellant never amended its Complaint, the significance of the Notice of Claim
extends only to determine when Appellant served the Notice of Claim on Appellee. This
Court should not accept facts alleged in the Notice of Claim where they are inconsistent with
Appellant's Complaint.
On March 15, 1999, the elements necessary to bring a complaint regarding the
offense at hand had occurred and is reflected by this date in Appellant's own original
Complaint.

(R. 1-12). Appellee respectfully submits that this Court should reject

Appellant's first point of error, and affirm the District Court's finding that Appellant's case
must be dismissed as a result Appellant's failure to comply with the statutory guidelines set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq..

14

II.

THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE ESTOPPED
FROM RAISING A FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM
ARGUMENT UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT.

This Court should affirm the District Court's ruling that Appellee is not estopped
form raising Appellant's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 as an
affirmative defense because Appellee properly raised this affirmative defense in Appellee's
Answer, and Appellee did nothing to mislead Appellant's case. Appellee asserts that
Appellant's case was procedurally flawed from the moment Appellant filed its Complaint
before the District Court. In fact, Appellee had no information to suggest Appellant's claim
existed until Appellant had filed its Complaint before the District Court. Appellee believes
that, as a matter of law, Appellee's affirmative defense No. 5 was sufficient to notify
Appellant of its failure to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 53).
Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996). In Shunk, the state attorney general's office
answered to the plaintiffs complaint and affirmatively pleaded, "plaintiff has failed to
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 et seq." Id. at 881.
Relying upon this affirmative defense, the defendant brought a motion for summary
judgment, citing the plaintiffs failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Id. The
Court found defendant's answer sufficient to assert an affirmative defense:
Where the statutes are clear, as in this case, as to the requirement for serving
a notice of claim on a political subdivision, we cannot require and the statutes
do not require that the state or its subdivisions promptly notify claimants of
deficiencies of the notice of claim so as to allow them an opportunity to timely
rectify their error or deficiency. Id. at 882.
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On this basis, the Court concluded that the defendant in Shunk was "not obligated to
deny compliance with section 63-30-13 when plaintiff had not alleged such compliance."
Id. The language of Appellee's Answer is virtually identical to the defendant's answer in
Shunk. The Appellee's affirmative defense reads as follows,
As a separate and affirmative defense, Defendant West Jordan City
affirmatively alleges that one or more of Plaintiff s claims may be barred by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-301 et seq. (R. 53).
Relying upon Shunk, the District Court ruled the language in the Appellee's answer to
Appellant's complaint as sufficient ground upon which to move for summary judgment in
this case, because Appellant had not alleged compliance with the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
Appellant is asking this Court to ignore Shunk on the basis that Appellee should be
estopped from raising Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 as an affirmative defense, under the
precedents set in Rice v. Granite School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), and Johnson
v. City of Bountiful 996 F.Supp (D. Utah 1998). Although Appellee acknowledges that the
decision in Rice was given from a Court of binding precedent, Appellee notes that Johnson
states a more concise basis for finding estoppel given the facts of this case. To establish a
claim of estoppel, Appellant must demonstrate:
(1) a statement or act by any one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted;
(2) a reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the
first party's statement or action; (3) injury to the second party that would
result from allowing the first party to contradict such statement or action.
Johnson, 996 F.Supp at 1103. The defendant in Johnson was estopped from asserting the
16

Governmental Immunity Act as an affirmative defense because, before plaintiffs time for
filing a proper notice of claim had lapsed, legal counsel for the defendant accepted liability
for the accident at issue, had agreed to pay for the plaintiffs damages, and had in fact paid
some of the plaintiffs expenses. Id.

These statements and acts were diametrically

inconsistent with the defendant's subsequent assertion that the plaintiffs failure to file a
notice of claim barred recovery. Id. The plaintiff had relied on the defendant's assurances
and partial payment, and so doing refrained from filing a notice of claim, and "plaintiff
would obviously be injured and the victim of injustice if [the defendant] were now allowed
to contradict such statements [by raising said affirmative defense]. Id. The plaintiff in Rice
had also been assured she would be indemnified for her injuries. Rice, 456 P.2d at 161. The
effect of such assurances was to lull her into a "false sense of security," which estopped the
defendant from asserting the plaintiffs claim was time-barred. Id. at 163.
Appellee asserts its actions cited by Appellant do not approach the facts of either Rice
or Johnson. In support of its estoppel claim, Appellant directs the Court's attention to an
affidavit filed in the District Court from Mr. Bradley G. Nycamp, Appellant's legal counsel,
regarding a telephone conversation between himself and the "West Jordan City Attorney."
(R. 190-191). Appellee notes that the facts which this affidavit does not assert, demonstrates
Appellant's basis for claiming estoppel is inadequate. Mr. Nycamp does not assert that (1)
he identified himself or his client; (2) that he had any meaningful discussion with the West
Jordan City Attorney about the facts of this case; or (3) that the West Jordan City Attorney
made any representations about the City's legal position on the merits of this case. (R. 19017

191). The most favorable interpretation of Mr. Nycamp's affidavit in support of Appellant
is that an anonymous telephone call was made to the West Jordan City Attorney's Office,
and a single question was asked regarding the procedure for serving a complaint upon
Appellee. We can only assume from the vagueness of Mr. Nycamp's affidavit that the West
Jordan City Attorney answered this question correctly.
To follow the argument of the Appellant, Appellee's counsel would be required to
conclude that a general discussion regarding the service of a complaint upon the City
requires the counsel for the City to voluntarily provide each anonymous telephone caller
with a legal tutorial on how to follow the statutory requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, because failure to do so would be inconsistent with raising Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-13 as an affirmative defense. Appellee believes that, where Mr. Xycamp did not
raise the Utah Governmental Immunity Act during this conversation, Appellee cannot have
taken an inconsistent position in its Answer, simply because the West Jordan City Attorney
did not volunteer information about the same during an anonymous telephone conversation.
The Supreme Court has reviewed other cases with more substantial facts in favor of
estoppel and held estoppel was not warranted.

Cornwall v. Larsen, et aU 571 P.2d 925,

(Utah 1977). In Cornwall a claimant's attorney failed to file a complaint against Salt Lake
County within one year after the claim was denied, as required by law in effect at that time.
Id. at 926. The claimant attempted to claim that Salt Lake County's insurance carrier
requested information from the claimant, thereby lulling the claimant into believing he
needn't comply with statutory requirements to maintain suit. Id. This argument was
18

summarily rejected because "the actions of the adjuster under those circumstances were not
such as would warrant a conclusion tha4, the clear mandate of the statute need not be
followed." Id. at 927. The facts under Cc Tiwall more strongly support estoppel than the
facts presented in this case because the claimant in Cornwall could at least establish that a
meaningful dialogue occurred between the parties. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found
insufficient ground to award estoppel.
Appellant also asserts that Appellee's req lest for an extension to answer discovery
supports Appellant's estoppel theory because App pliant did not discover it neglected to file
a Notice of Claim until it received Appellant's answ ?r to interrogatories. Because it granted
an extension, Appellant received discovery after the time for filing a Notice of Claim had
lapsed. As already noted, Appellee believes that Appellant cannot claim surprise where
Appellee's Answer to Appellant's Complaint identified Appellant's failure to comply with
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Furthermore, du.ing oral argument for Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment before the District Court, Appellee explained that he did not
request an extension because of an intent to deceive Appellant, which squarely refuted the
proposition that the request lulled Appellant into refraining . -om filing a Notice of Claim.
In response to hearing Appellee's argument, Appellant accep sd our explanation, stating,
more or less, that they "take [Appellee's legal counsel] at his wo.d," and effectively waived
Appellant's estoppel claim before the District Court, concentrating instead on whether the
last event to trigger Appellant's cause of action occurred after Ma/ch 15, 1999. Appellant
has attempted to shield this Court from these facts by certifying thai a transcript of the oral
19

argument is not required for this case. (R. 413). As z general rule, where a litigant raises
an issue by motion before a District Court, but subsequently waives the same during oral
argument or trial, this Court will not review the issue on appeal. See generally Hart v. Salt
Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997). Under the facts of this case,
Appellee is at least entitled to a presumption thru the District Court correctly disposed of
issues surrounding Appellant's estoppel claim oecause this Court contains an inadequate
record of the same. Sawyers v. Sawyers. 558 P.2d 607, 608-609 (Utah 1976). Once this
Court settles on which facts it may review tc judge Appellant's estoppel claim, this Court
must remain cognizant of whether estopp J1 here would be adverse upon public policy.
Appellee "may not be estopped unless injustice would result and there would be no
substantial adverse effect on public policy." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. Of State
Lands. 802 P. 2d 720,728 (Utah 1990). Appellee believes that granting estoppel in this case
here would adversely impact public policy for several reasons. First, Appellee believes that
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, as written, was intended to prolect governmental
entities from excessive,frivolousli1 igation at the taxpayers' expense. Where a governmental
entity is surprised, by service of a lawsuit, to leam that a dispute exists, this Court should not
estop the entity from raising Ut .h Code Ann. § 63-30-13 as a defense, because estoppel in
this instance would effectively expose the entity to excessive litigation.
Second, Appellant cannot blame Appellee for its own neglect in this case. Appellee
notes that Appellant is a sophisticated business entity within the state of Utah, represented
by sophisticated legal counsel which Appellant retained within a year from the date this
20

cause of action occurred. Because this case consists of a sophisticated litigant which made
an elementary legal error on it own accord, estoppel would result in placing a duty on the
West Jordan City Attorney to serve and protect the legal rights of parties who bring adverse
claims against Appellee. The West Jordan City Attorney cannot simultaneously represent
the interest of Appellant and his own client. Appellee believes this case would establish
such a precedent, where there are no facts to show Appellee's assertion of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-13 is inconsistent with a prior legal position.
Appellant seeks to support its estoppel claim by asking this Court to accept the law
of New Jersey as binding precedent, under Hill v. Middletown Bid of Ed., 443 A.2d 225
(N.J. Super.A.D. 1982). Appellant submits that this Court should not rely upon Hill.
Appellant ignores the fact that Hill arises from a general rule in New Jersey where, "even
if there is no substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act, a
public entity will be estopped from asserting this defense "where the interests of justice,
morality, and common fairness dictate that course."" Id. at 227, Quoting Anske v. Palisades
Park, 139 N.J. Super. 342,348 (App. Div. 1976). Appellee has already stated, following the
Plateau Mining Co. case, that this Court cannot estop Appellee until it finds injustice and
an adverse effect on public policy would result. Id Furthermore, the law of New Jersey
enables the courts to exercise discretion in extending a 90 day filing requirement to a period
of one year. Hill at 227. In sharp contrast to New Jersey law, a claimant's failure to strictly
comply with the notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
"deprive[s] the District Court of jurisdiction" over the cause of action. Litster v. Utah
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Vallev Community College. 881 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah App. 1992). This is true regardless
of whether the governmental entity has actual notice of the claim. Id. Appellee believes that
since Utah law hinges subject matter jurisdiction upon whether a notice of claim is timely
filed, the grounds for estoppel are substantially narrower than that of New Jersey.
Appellant's original Complaint stated that the cause of action arose on March 15,
1999. The actions of the Appellee under the facts of this case do not draw a reasonable
mind to the conclusion that the clear mandate of the statute need not be followed. Appellant
admitted to failing to give proper notice to Appellee in his own Opposition to Defendant
West Jordan City's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rl 16), and has failed to provide proof
as to the Appellees inducement or misleading statements or actions that refrained Appellant
from filing a timely Notice of Claim. As a result of the facts and argument as given above,
Appellee respectfully submits that Appellant's second point of error should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For the reasons stated above, no reversible error has been committed and the Appellee
respectfully prays that the Honorable Court of Appeals should in all things affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,

Ryan Carter
Assistant City Attorney
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I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing brief has
been delivered to Arnold Richer or Mark E. Medcalf, attorney's for the Appellant, by
placing a copy in the United States Mail, addressed to Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C., 6925
South Union Park Center, Suite 450, Midvale, Utah 84047 on this j£_ day oikiA&tiST
2001.

Ryan Carter
Assistant City Attorney
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